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Abstract
This paper develops a Bayesian Global VAR (GVAR) model to track the international
transmission dynamics of two stylized shocks, namely a supply and demand shock to
US-based safe assets. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find
that (positive) supply-sided shocks lead to pronounced increases in economic activity
which spills over to foreign countries. The impact of supply-sided shocks can also be
seen for other quantities of interest, most notably equity prices and exchange rates
in Europe. Second, a demand-sided shock leads to an appreciation of the US dollar
and generally lower yields on US securities, forcing investors to shift their portfolios
towards foreign fixed income securities. This yields sizable positive effects on US out-
put, equity prices and a general decrease in financial market volatility.
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1. Introduction
The availability of safe assets during the aftermath of the global financial crisis
has gained increasing attention from policy makers, both in advanced and emerging
economies.1 As several assets that belong to the “triple-A” category are not always
entirely risk free, financial market participants invest in US treasuries, which are typi-
cally considered as risk free. However, during the crisis, the US Fed heavily intervened
on the market for long-term US treasury bonds, significantly lowering the availability
of safe assets.
The recent shortage of safe assets is not a new phenomenon. Several authors
find considerable evidence that the sharp decline in the availability of safe assets
translates into increased financial instability and impacts the effectiveness of various
economic policy measures. Portes (2011) argues that insufficient supply of safe assets
has depressed real interest rates to historical low values, increasing the incentive of
investors to search for excessively risky assets with higher returns, such as real estate.
Such insufficient supply of safe assets is considered to be a cause of global imbalances
and asset bubbles that ultimately culminated in the burst of the US subprime bub-
ble in early 2007. Caballero (2006) states that excess demand of safe assets led to
tight spreads, low yields and sharp increases in asset price volatility across advanced
economies.2 DeLong (2012) finds that precautionary motives increased the excess de-
mand for safe assets during the crisis, while supply fell as counterparty risk increased
due to information-sensitive debt. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) show that
the inability of emerging markets to supply safe assets led to global imbalances and
lowered interest rates across the globe. However, since the global crisis and the re-
covery thereafter, the gap between the demand and supply of safe assets continues to
increase, possibly translating in further financial instability. As a result, insufficient
supply or excess demand can determine the shortage of safe assets.
In this paper, we focus attention on US portfolio investment. The US is a spe-
cial case because prior to the crisis, huge amounts of capital from foreign countries,
precisely Asian and oil/commodity producing countries, poured into the US economy
through the build-up of dollar denominated reserves.3 The rest of the world displayed
1Safe assets are typically perceived to be a reliable store of value which contains almost no uncer-
tainty about future payments. Moreover, save assets can be used as a collateral and are often utilized
as a benchmark to value risky assets.
2Caballero (2006) defines this as a bubbly equilibrium.
3Ben Bernanke coined this phenomena as the global saving glut hypothesis which led to a long-
lasting decrease in real interest rates. The net position in the US has increased enormously, generating
a deep current account deficit. However, gross flows are also very important and their increasing trend
has gained momentum since the early 2000s. See Johnson (2009); Obstfeld (2012); Shin (2012);
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a particular appetite for US Treasury and Agency assets, i.e. safe assets, coupled with
the inability of emerging market economies to issue safe assets because of limited
institutional capability.4 Caballero and Farhi (2014) find that such increases in the
shortage of safe assets for any given safe interest rate lead to a persistent down-
ward trend in the equilibrium interest rate, which turned the economy in a secular
stagnation. During the post-crisis period, the shortage of safe assets has continued
as the availability of assets perceived safe was falling due to rating downgrades of
sovereigns. Since the financial crisis in 2007, investors faced severe difficulties to
find safety and liquidity. Such excess demand results in low yields, tight spreads and
higher asset price volatility. As a consequence, advanced economies, in particular
the US, have been reallocating assets towards emerging markets. Burger, Sengupta,
Warnock, and Warnock (2015) show, for the post-crisis period, that US investors’
increasingly raise their exposure with respect to emerging markets, more precisely
towards local currency bonds. This finding mainly stems from global “push” factors
such as low US long-term interest rates and unconventional monetary policy.
Understanding the consequences of an US based shortage in safe assets is crucial
for achieving financial stability. To this aim, we explore the macroeconomic conse-
quences of a supply and demand-sided shortage in US safe assets5 across the globe.
We investigate this shortage by considering a situation where the ZLB is binding or
non-binding by performing two counterfactual experiments.6 In the first experiment
we allow short-term interest rates to move freely and in the second experiment we
assume that short-term interest rates are effectively constrained by zero.
In order to identify supply and demand-sided shocks for US safe assets, we es-
timate a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model over the period ranging from
1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4 for 34 economies. Our modeling approach is based on Feld-
kircher and Huber (2016) and Crespo Cuaresma, Feldkircher, and Huber (2016), who
put forward a Bayesian variant of the GVAR model to alleviate the curse of dimension-
Punzi and Kauko (2015).
4See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008a) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008b).
5In our identification scheme we assume that a positive shock can rise the demand for safe assets
because of fear and uncertainty during crisis periods or in times central banks increasingly conduct
unconventional monetary policy, while a negative shock can affect the supply of safe assets due to the
disappearance of private-label safe assets.
6Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016) show that, as long as the ZLB is not binding, when
shocks hit the economy, the prices of safe assets adjust and interest rates decrease even to negative
values to restore equilibrium. At the ZLB, interest rates are not able to dip below zero. This increases
the shortage of safe assets in the form of US treasury securities and prevents the price of treasuries to
increase in order to satisfy the excess demand. Therefore, investors will not purchase enough treasury
securities to sufficiently raise prices (i.e. lower interest rates) and clear the market.
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ality. Using a global-local shrinkage prior in the spirit of Griffin and Brown (2005) and
applied to the VAR case in Huber and Feldkircher (2016) allows us to shrink the high-
dimensional parameter space towards a simpler model specification. To cope with the
fact that the volatility of macroeconomic shocks displayed pronounced movements
over time, we adopt a stochastic volatility (SV) specification in the spirit of Cogley
and Sargent (2005) and utilized in Huber (2016). To identify structural demand and
supply shocks we follow Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016) and use sign restric-
tions imposed on the US responses and the average international responses of certain
key macroeconomic quantities. On the supply side, as a proxy for the availability
of US safe assets, we update data from Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012) until
2015. Their measure is constructed as the sum of US government debt and the safe
component of private financial debt. On the demand side, we use data from Bertaut
and Tryon (2007) and Bertaut and Judson (2014) to account for the global demand
of US safe assets. Indeed foreigners owned about 71 percent of all US federal govern-
ment debt in 2015, compared to 20 percent of marketable Treasuries outstanding in
1994.7
Our findings indicate that a increase in the supply of US safe assets generates
an increase in US real activity. Taking an international stance, this effect spills over
to other countries and foreign GDP also increases sharply, as predicted in Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2015) and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016) (for a
negative supply shock). However, this finding arises only for a limited set of countries
under consideration, most notably countries that appear to be among the largest (in
dollar terms) international investors in the US treasury market. The insufficient sup-
ply of US safe assets, coupled with “search for yield” considerations, leads US investor
to increase claims versus foreign countries and affect the rest of the world through
the portfolio re-balancing channel. Similarly to Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong (2014),
we find that since the crisis, foreign countries have expanded their supply of debt
securities, meeting the US demand for safe and liquid assets.8 On the other hand, the
global economy tends to be much more reactive with respect to a demand-side shock.
US Treasury securities are perceived as a “safe haven” compared with other assets be-
cause of low perceived default risk and greater liquidity. As a result, foreign investors
7More important aspect is that, among foreign investors, official institutions have taken strong
inelastic positions, meaning that the purpose of safe store of value allow them to buy US treasury
regardless of prices and interest rates. See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).
8Similarly, Bertaut, Tabova, andWong (2014) show that post-crisis, US investors have increase their
demand for foreign safe assets, with particular interest in Australian and Canadian dollar-denominated
debt. Foreign financial sector, contrary to the past, has been active in producing safe assets to meet the
increasing US demand.
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engaged in a “flight to safety” during pre- and post-crisis periods. We find that higher
global demand leads to an increase in US output and to a temporary decrease in the
volatility index VIX. Such a surge in capital inflows leads to an appreciation of the US
dollar and lower spreads, therefore influencing foreign countries via the liquidity and
exchange rate channels. More specifically, foreign output and equity prices increase
while interest rates in foreign economies tend to decrease in order to avoid a strong
appreciation of the foreign currency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a comprehensive
literature review on the importance of safe assets and international spillover effects.
Section 3 discuss the GVAR model adopted in the empirical application. Section 4
describes the data and the identification of demand and supply shocks. Section 5
presents the results. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
This paper relates to different strands of the literature on international finance.
First, the paper contributes to the literature on international portfolio allocation and
cross-country interdependencies. In a recent contribution, Burger, Sengupta, Warnock,
and Warnock (2015) analyze the impact of portfolio re-allocations on US bond port-
folios and conclude that global “push” factors, like historically low US long-term in-
terest rates and quantitative easing, have contributed to the increasing demand of US
investors for emerging market (EMEs) securities. Burger, Sengupta, Warnock, and
Warnock (2015) find that among EMEs, capital flows have been directed to coun-
tries with sound macroeconomic fundamentals like low inflation volatility and posi-
tive current account balances. Fratzscher (2012) shows that global liquidity and risk
largely affect capital flows during periods of crisis and recovery, but the impact is
highly heterogeneous, depending on the quality of institutions and the fundamentals
of the home country. Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012),
Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that large debt
inflows, in the form of surges and stops, are dangerous because they sharply increase
credit and therefore the probability of crises. When capital flows from advanced to
emerging economies, real exchange rates tend to appreciate, corporate debt increases
and asset prices tick up, leading to adverse effects on financial stability.
Bernanke et al. (2005) and Bernanke et al. (2007) introduced the global savings
glut hypothesis, stating that the excess supply of savings relative to investments in sur-
plus countries was channeled into deficit countries, adversely impacting credit condi-
tions. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) explain how foreign demand for safe US
dollar-denominated assets leads to a shift towards advanced financial instruments,
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stimulating the necessity to create innovative ways of mortgage processing. This led
to the creation of low-risk assets that have been strongly demanded by international
investors. Thus, such recent developments made it possible to pool loans of low qual-
ity and transform them into highly rated securities that have been largely recognized
as being safe investments. This in turn had substantial macroeconomic consequences.
Capital flows from emerging markets made credit cheap and fueled the boom in asset
prices (see, for example, Bertaut, DeMarco, Kamin, and Tryon, 2012).
Another stream of the literature focuses on gross-border banking flows. The find-
ings in Shin (2012) suggest that the loose credit conditions in the US can be attributed
to gross cross-border positions rather than net capital flows. Punzi and Kauko (2015)
also distinguish between gross and net flows in explaining the US housing and credit
boom.
The paper is also closely linked to the literature on the shortage of safe assets
and its impact on global interest rates, capital flows and economic crises (Caballero,
2006; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008b; Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008,
2016). This literature explicitly deals with the ZLB. During normal times, countries
that are running a current account surplus are tempted to buy foreign safe assets
because of insufficient domestic supply. This requires interest rates to decrease in
order to restore equilibrium across economies. When the ZLB is binding, interest
rates are not able to restore equilibrium, therefore output and exchange rates adjust
endogenously, generating a global recession. On the supply side, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012, 2015) show that the decline in the supply of Treasury bonds
also exerts downward pressure on yields. The premium associated to those risk-free
government securities declines with the total supply of Treasury bonds.9 If financial
sector short-term debt is due to demand for safety/liquidity, then Treasury supply
should crowd out financial sector short-term debt via effects on the equilibrium prices
of safety and liquidity.
Moreover, the present contribution is also related to the growing literature on
trade and financial integration. Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Perri and Quadrini
(2011) show that domestic shocks propagate across countries as asset prices and the
cost of credit clear in international markets, while Devereux and Yetman (2010) and
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) show how leverage-constrained investors rebalance
their diversified international portfolios.
Finally, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on the international trans-
mission of shocks using multi-country VAR models. Canova (2005), using a sign re-
striction approach to analyze the response of eight Latin American countries to three
9Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) label this the ”moneyness” premium.
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different US shocks, finds that US monetary policy shocks have larger and significant
effects on Latin American domestic macroeconomic variables, relative to US aggregate
demand and supply shocks. Similarly, Feldkircher and Huber (2016) estimate a GVAR
model and find that US based demand, supply and monetary policy shocks generate
pronounced international spillovers. Galesi and Sgherri (2009) also utilizes a GVAR
model and concludes that in the short run, asset prices are the main channel through
which financial shocks are transmitted internationally. Chudik and Fratzscher (2011)
employ a GVAR approach to highlight the diversity of the transmission channels.
Tightening financial conditions and monetary policy shocks in advanced economies
are identified to be important sources of international business cycles and liquidity
shocks have been relatively more important for advanced economies than for emerg-
ing market economies . By contrast, they find that developing economies were mostly
affected by shocks to the risk appetite relative to advanced economies.
3. The econometric framework
This section describes the econometric framework adopted. Section 3.1 briefly
discusses the GVAR with stochastic volatility model (GVAR-SV) and describes the fea-
tures of the model. Section 3.2 provides an overview on the prior setup and the
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm used.
3.1. A global macroeconomic model
The GVARmodel, originally proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann, andWeiner (2004),
builds on a set of N + 1 country-specific VAR models augmented with weakly ex-
ogenous regressors that aim to approximate observed or unobserved global factors.
These weakly exogenous variables are constructed by taking weighted averages of
other countries’ endogenous variables.
For a typical country i, we assume that xit, a ki-dimensional vector of endogenous
variables, is described by the following VARX*(P ,Q) model10,
xit = ai0 +
P∑
p=1
Ψipxit−p +
Q∑
q=0
Λiqx
∗
it−q + εit, (3.1)
with
• ai0 being a ki-dimensional vector of intercept terms,
10In the empirical application we use P = Q = 2 lags.
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• Ψip for p = 1, . . . , P is a ki × ki matrix of autoregressive coefficients associated
with the pth lag of the endogenous variable,
• Λiq for q = 0, . . . , Q are coefficient matrices associated with the k∗i weakly exoge-
nous variables x∗it. The k
∗
i weakly exogenous variables in x
∗
it are constructed by
taking weighted averages of other countries’ endogenous variables, i.e.
x∗it =
N∑
j=0
wijxjt. (3.2)
Here we let wij be a set of bilateral weights between countries i and j that sum
to unity.
• Finally, we let εit be a vector white noise error term with
εit ∼ N (0,Σit). (3.3)
Σit denotes a time varying variance-covariance matrix of dimension ki × ki.
We control for time-variation in the volatility of the structural errors by using a
stochastic volatility model. Specifically, we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Huber (2016) and decompose Σit as
Σit = U iH itU
′
i, (3.4)
where U i is a lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal and typical off-diagonal
element ui,jn j = 2, . . . , ki; n = 1, . . . , j − 1. Furthermore we let H t be a diagonal
matrix with typical diagonal element ehi,jt (j = 1, . . . , ki). The hi,jt’s are log-volatilities
that follow an AR(1) process,
hit = µi + ρi(hit−1 − µi) + νit. (3.5)
In Eq. (3.5), µi denotes the mean of the log-volatility, ρi the persistence parameter
and νit is a normally distributed zero mean error term with variance ς2i . Equation
(3.5) assumes that the log-volatility evolves smoothly over time and is stationary. As
opposed to the recent macroeconomic literature that typically imposes a random walk
state equation this choice rules out explosive behavior of the underlying log-volatility
if T becomes large.
Before we derive the global representation of the model a few words on the impli-
cations of the model are in order. At the individual country level, the presence of the
weakly exogenous variables accounts for the presence of global factors that impacts
8
all countries simultaneously. The inclusion of these international proxies accounts for
cross-country correlation in the errors and allows the country-specific models to be
treated as being independent from each other, effectively simplifying the estimation
problem at hand considerably. Moreover, our specification of the variance-covariance
matrix implies that the volatility of the shocks is smoothly evolving over time. We
assume that the autoregressive parameters are constant over time. This assumption
is based on the literature on time-varying parameter models that find only limited
evidence in favor of structural breaks, especially for US data (for a discussion, see
Primiceri, 2005; Koop, Leon-Gonzalez, and Strachan, 2009).11
In order to derive the global VARmodel it proves to be convenient to set P = Q = 1
and work with the VARX*(1,1) model. Rewriting Eq. (3.1) yields
xit −Λi0x∗it = ai0 +Ψi1xit−1 +Λi1x∗it−1 + εit, (3.6)
which can be further simplified as
Aizit = ai0 +Bizit−1 + εit. (3.7)
Here, we let Ai = (Iki ,Λi0), Bi = (Ψi1,Λi1) and zit = (x
′
it,x
∗′
it )
′. Introducing a
so-called global vector xt = (x′0t, . . . ,x
′
Nt)
′ of dimension k =
∑N
j=0 kj and a suitable
(ki + k
+
i )× k linking matrixW i allows us to state zit in terms of the global vector,
zit =W ixt. (3.8)
Stacking the equations for each country finally yields
Gxt = b0 + Fxt−1 + εt (3.9)
where
b0 = (a
′
00, . . . ,a
′
N0)
′,
G = ((A0W 0)
′, . . . , (ANWN)′)′,
F = ((B0W 0)
′, . . . , (BNWN)′)′,
εt = (ε
′
0t, . . . , ε
′
Nt)
′.
11Allowing for time-variation in the parameters in a GVAR framework has been introduced by Cre-
spo Cuaresma, Doppelhofer, Feldkircher, and Huber (2016). However, in that contribution the number
of endogenous variables at the individual country level appears to be much smaller as compared to the
present application.
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The errors in εt feature a variance-covariance matrix that is block-diagonal with Σit
being in the ith diagonal block of this matrix.
After multiplying with G−1 from the left the model can be used to perform struc-
tural analysis or forecasting. In addition, the matrix G serves to establish contempo-
raneous relationships between countries in our system of equations.
3.2. Bayesian inference
Because the model outlined in the previous subsection is heavily parameterized
and the time span we cover rather limited, we adopt a Bayesian approach to esti-
mation and inference. This implies that we have to specify a suitable set of prior
distributions on the parameters in Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.5). Our prior setup is a variant
of the Normal-Gamma (NG) prior stipulated in Griffin and Brown (2005) and applied
to the VAR case in Huber and Feldkircher (2016).
It proves to be convenient to collect all slope coefficients and the intercept in a
generic matrix Ξi with typical element ξij (j = 1, . . . , Ki) where Ki = ki(1 + ki × P +
k∗i × (Q+ 1)) denotes the number of autoregressive coefficients in country i’s model.
We impose a normally distributed prior on the elements of Ξi,
ξij|τ 2ij, λ2i ∼ N (0, 2/λ2ξiτ 2ij), (3.10)
τ 2ij ∼ G(ϑτi, ϑτi), (3.11)
λ2ξi ∼ G(κξ0, κξ1), (3.12)
where τ 2ij are local shrinkage parameters that apply an individual degree of shrinkage
to each coefficient in the model, λ2ξi is a country-specific shrinkage parameter that
exerts shrinkage on the full matrix Ξi. On both, the local and the country-specific
shrinkage parameters, we impose a set of Gamma priors with hyperparameters ϑτi,
κξ0 and κξ1. This prior setup provides significant flexibility by inducing a heavy tailed
marginal prior on ξij implying that this prior setup allows for non-zero coefficients
even in the presence of heavy country-specific (overall) shrinkage stemming from
λ2ξi. In the empirical application we set κξ0 = κξ1 = 0.01 to induce large amounts
of shrinkage on all coefficients of a given country and set ϑτi = 0.6 for all countries.
Note that ϑτi = 1 would lead to the Bayesian LASSO (see, for example, Kozumi and
Kobayashi, 2011; Gefang, 2014).
For the variance-covariance matrix we impose the same set of normally distributed
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priors on the the free elements of U i,
ui,jn ∼ N (0, 2/λ2uiφ2i,jn), (3.13)
φ2i,jn ∼ G(ϑφi, ϑφi), (3.14)
λ2ui ∼ G(κu0, κu1). (3.15)
The hyperparameters are defined analogously to the case of the prior on Ξi. This
prior specification allows for shrinkage on the covariance parameters of the variance-
covariance matrix, where the country-specific shrinkage parameter λ2ui pulls all covari-
ance parameters towards zero and the individual shrinkage parameters φ2i,jn provide
the possibility to allow for non-zero covariance parameters even if λ2ui is large.
Finally, we follow Kastner and Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter (2013) and use a normally
distributed prior on µi, i.e. µi ∼ N (0, 102), a Beta distributed prior on ρ, ρ+12 ∼ B(25, 5)
and a Gamma prior on ς2i ∼ G(1/2, 1/2). The prior on µi is specified to be rather
uninformative while the prior on ρi places sufficient mass on high persistence regions
of the parameter space. The Gamma prior on ς2i translates into a normally distributed
prior on ±ςi with mean zero and variance unity.
Estimation is carried out on a country-by-country basis as described in Crespo
Cuaresma, Feldkircher, and Huber (2016). Fortunately, most conditional posterior
distributions take convenient forms, rendering simple Gibbs steps feasible. For some
parameters, however, we use a low-dimensional random walk Metropolis Hastings
update. More details of the corresponding MCMC algorithm are available in Huber
and Feldkircher (2016). For all results presented below we simulate a Markov chain
with 30,000 iterations where we discard the first 15,000 as burn-in.
4. Data overview and model specification
Our dataset comprises a broad set of 34 developed and developing countries12
that cover over 90% of global output measured over the time period ranging from
1994:Q1 to 2014:Q4.
For a typical country i, we include a broad battery of macroeconomic and financial
variables to approximate demand and supply-sided movements as well as financial
12 More specifically, the countries included are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain
(ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Australia
(AU), Canada (CA), Switzerland (CH), Japan (JP), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE), United Kingdom (UK),
United States (US), Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), China (CN), Indonesia (ID), India (IN),
South Korea (KR), Mexico (MX), Malaysia (MY), Peru (PE), Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), Thailand
(TH), South Africa (ZA), Turkey (TR), Denmark (DK).
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market behavior. More precisely, we consider the following variables in our GVAR
estimation,
xit = (yit, Dpit, rerit, stirit, rpit, eqit, Liabit, Claimsit, swapsit)’.
Here, we let yit denote real GDP, Dpit denotes CPI inflation, rerit is the real exchange
rate measured against the US dollar so that ∆rerit > 0 implies an appreciation of
the US dollar, stirit are short-term interest rates (three-month money market rates)
and rpit denotes the risk premium, measured by taking the difference between ten-
year government bond yields in country i and the corresponding ten-year yield on
US treasuries. Moreover, we let eqit be the log of the largest equity price index in
each country to approximate movements in asset prices. Liabit measures the foreign
holdings of US long-term securities, Claimsit represents the US holdings of foreign
long-term debt securities and swapsit are the US Fed swap lines.13 The US country
model differs slightly because we also include data on the volatility index (labeled
V IXUS,t and the ratio of US safe assets to GDP (
SAUS,t
yUS,t
, labeled safeUS,t).
The weakly exogenous variables included are symmetric except for the real ex-
change rate, which are only included as a weakly exogenous variable in the US coun-
try model. This implies that x∗it features the same set of variables as xit, excluding the
real exchange rate, for all countries except the US.
safeUS,t is used to represent the supply of US safe assets. We rely on Gorton,
Lewellen, and Metrick (2012)’s list of safe assets in constructing this series with the
corresponding data stemming from the US Flow of Funds.14 This measure pools data
on the liabilities of financial intermediaries and the government that are information-
insensitive, i.e. securities whose value is immune to adverse selection in exchange,
and thus reduces the incentive of traders to verify the assets’ creditworthiness. The
safe asset measure is constructed as the sum of US government debt and the safe
component of private financial debt.15 According to Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick
(2012), deposits are the most obvious example of safe assets, despite the fact that
Treasury and Agency assets are also information-insensitive and share other typical
13Data include all operations conducted between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada, the
Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Reserve
Bank of Australia, the Bank of Korea and the Bank of Mexico between the forth quarter of 2007 and
the third quarter of 2010.
14See the Data Appendix in Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012) for details of the corresponding
composition of this measure.
15Alternative measures of the availability of US safe assets can be found in Bertaut, Tabova, and
Wong (2014). They consider only the availability of safe assets to private investors, therefore they
exclude from Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012)’s share the holdings of safe assets by the Federal
Reserve and by foreign official investors.
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characteristics of safe assets.16 Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012) also compute
an “high” and “low” estimate of the amount of safe debt in the US. The high category
includes all government and financial-sector liabilities, which largely comprise Trea-
suries, municipal bonds, short-term and long-term corporate debt, securitized debt,
and other miscellaneous liabilities, while the low category excludes miscellaneous fi-
nancial liabilities, loans, a number of accounts involving payables, and other liabilities
that are not routinely traded. In our estimation, we consider only the high-type of safe
assets because we assume that the insufficient availability of safe assets is mainly due
to the decreasing amount of treasuries and securitized debt.
On the demand side, we use data from Bertaut and Tryon (2007) and Bertaut and
Judson (2014) to construct a measure for the demand of US safe assets from abroad.17
In particular, we combine the demand for US treasury and agency bonds from foreign
investors (see Table 1, Panel “liabilities”).
In order to evaluate the international impact of increasing demand or decreasing
supply of US safe assets, we measure the implications on capital outflows from the
US to the rest of the world with the aim to highlight the increasing appetite of US
investors for foreign safe assets in their search for yield (see Table 1, Panel “assets”).
During the post-crisis period, the Federal Reserve has absorbed more than half of
the increase in outstanding safe government debt through different large scale asset
purchasing programs, implying that less safe assets have been available to private in-
vestors. As a result, US investors displayed increasing demand for foreign safe assets,
which is in contrast to their past behavior.18 Table 1 shows that the foreign holdings of
US long-term securities have been considerably larger than the foreign securities held
by US residents, and the net US position in long-term securities continued to decline
over time. However, since the implementation of quantitative easing measures and
the hit of the ZLB, the ratio of US to foreign holdings approached 60 percent in 2015
from an initial 54 percent in 2009, meaning that US residents increasingly shifted
investment opportunities towards advanced and emerging economies.19
Before proceeding to the next subsection a brief word on the specification of the
16Another important role of safe assets and highly-rated government is that they can act as collateral
in financial transactions, mimicking the role of money.
17Bertaut and Judson (2014) estimate the demand for monthly US cross-border securities, combin-
ing information from detailed annual Treasury International Capital (TIC) surveys with new informa-
tion from the TIC form SLT, “Aggregate Holdings of Long-Term Securities by US and Foreign Residents.”
Bertaut and Judson (2014) decompose monthly data into flows, estimated valuation changes, and a
residual gap in order to incorporate additional adjustments to the transactions data and survey data.
18See Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong (2014).
19In particular, Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong (2014) report that US investors have increase their
demand for Australian and Canadian dollar-denominated debt.
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Table 1: Market value of U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities and foreign holdings of U.S.
long-term securities, as of selected survey dates. (Billions of dollars)
U.S. holdings of Foreign holdings of U.S. holdings as
foreign long-term U.S. long-term a share of foreign Net asset positions in
securities securities holdings long-term securities
(assets) (liabilities) (assets/liabilities) of U.S. residents
Dec. 1994 870 1,244 0.7 -374
Mar. 2000 2,678 3,558 0.75 -880
Jun. 2002 2,129 3,926 0.54 -1,797
Jun. 2003 2,367 4,503 0.53 -2,136
Jun. 2004 3,027 5,431 0.56 -2,404
Jun. 2005 3,728 6,262 0.6 -2,534
Jun. 2006 4,799 7,162 0.67 -2,363
Jun. 2007 6,429 9,136 0.7 -2,707
Jun. 2008 6,324 9,463 0.67 -3,139
Jun. 2009 4,615 8,492 0.54 -3,877
Jun. 2010 5,282 9,736 0.54 -4,454
Jun. 2011 6,830 11,561 0.59 -4,731
Jun. 2012 6,834 12,451 0.55 -5,616
Jun. 2013 7,842 13,532 0.58 -5,691
Jun. 2014 9,603 15,539 0.62 -5,936
Jun. 2015 9,737 16,202 0.6 -6,465
Source: Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities as of 6/30/2015 from the T.I.C System. Net
foreign holdings are defined as U.S. holdings of foreign securities minus foreign holdings of U.S. secu-
rities.
weighting matrices is in order. In the following application we have decided to rely
on average trade weights over the estimation sample to connect the country-specific
VAR models. This choice is based on comparing a set of different weighting schemes.
Specifically, we use trade weights at the start of the sample, weights based on simple
geographical distances, weights based on bilateral FDI flows and a mixture of trade
weights to connect real variables and weights based on bilateral banking exposure to
link financial variables together. For each of these different weighting schemes we
compute the deviance information criterion (DIC, see Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, and
Van Der Linde, 2002) and pick the model that yields the lowest DIC. In our case,
average trade weights outperform all competing weights, with performance gains vis-
a-vis all schemes except the mixed scheme being particularly pronounced. In the
mixed case, however, the differences are rather small, corroborating the findings in
Feldkircher and Huber (2016). However, after estimating the model and the corre-
sponding impulse responses with the mixed scheme we find no discernible differences
between our findings and thus opt for the simpler specification.
14
4.1. Identification
We carefully follow the IS-LM/Mundell-Fleming framework adopted by Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016) to identify supply and demand shocks in the US safe
asset market. In contrast to Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016) we perform two
counterfactual exercises. In the first one (our baseline) we assume that the ZLB binds
only on impact, implying that the central bank reacts sluggishly with respect to supply
and demand shocks. The second scenario assumes that the policy rate is deemed to
remain at zero over the impulse response horizon.20
Our approach to identification is based on sign restrictions as proposed by Uhlig
(2005), where we apply the algorithm of Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010).
More specifically, we identify supply and demand shocks by using the set of restric-
tions shown in Table 2. The restrictions we impose are as follows. A shrinking supply
of safe assets in the US, i.e. a decrease in safeUS,t, leads to a persistent reduction21
in output (under the assumption that US output decreases over the first ten quar-
ters) and an increase in the risk premium. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016)
show that a central bank could avoid the output reduction by lowering the interest
rate. However, during periods of the ZLB, this is not feasible and the country enters
a liquidity trap. As countries are strongly interconnected, and still considering the
inability to use the interest rate to re-balance the shortage, the exchange rate plays a
crucial role in the adjustment process. As a result, the US dollar depreciates and the
valuation effect reduces the scarcity of safe assets (in dollar terms). However, even if
the exchange rate works in order to restore equilibrium, the US still suffers a rather
pronounced drop in real activity. For the remaining variables, we impose no further
restrictions (see Table 2, column 1).
In identifying demand shocks, we assume that a positive shock to the liabilities on
foreign countries, , i.e. an increase in Liab, generates an increase in output and the
return on safe assets, that means income is allocated and reinvested into safe assets,
leading to a decrease in the risk premium (see Table 2, second column). Techni-
cally, this is implemented by simultaneously shocking the bond time series for the six
countries that display the highest share of liabilities, i.e. foreign demand of US safe
assets (treasury and agency bonds).22 US interest rate responses equal zero because
nominal short-term interest rates are bound by the ZLB initially. Increasing capital
inflows in the US lead to a drop in the long-term interest rate, which translates into
20Within the GVAR framework this implies that we zero-out the structural coefficients of the mone-
tary policy rule for the US country model over the impulse response horizon.
21Here we define the sign restrictions in terms of a negative supply shock. In the following applica-
tion we consider a positive supply shock for exposition purposes.
22In our case, the countries are Germany, Switzerland, China, Korea, Japan and the United Kingdom.
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a drop in the risk premium. This means that investors are searching for yield given
the ultra-low level of US interest rates. As shown in Mendicino and Punzi (2014),
Punzi and Kauko (2015) and Sa´ and Wieladek (2015), the increase in the perceived
safety of US bonds encourages foreign investors to reallocate parts of their savings
to domestic assets. However, the ZLB and the quantitative easing policy, which tend
to limit investment opportunities for US residents, lead a redistribution of resources
away from the US towards foreign economies, leading to a future reduction in the
US output and an increase in foreign output. Foreign interest rates decrease, reflect-
ing the increase in demand for foreign bonds and the reduction in demand for US
safe assets. Currencies appreciate and risk premia decrease, making it easier for US
residents to invest abroad. The greater availability of US funds in foreign economies
generates a greater availability of credit, leading to credit and asset price booms.
Table 2: Sign Restrictions
Variables Supply Demand
Shock Shock
(1) (2)
safeUS,t + ?
Liabit ? +
Claimsit ? ?
stirUS,t 0 0
stirit ? ?
yUS,t - +
yit ? ?
DpUS,t ? ?
Dpit ? ?
rpit + -
eqUS,t ? ?
V IXUS,t ? ?
rerit - -
Notes: Responses marked with ? are left unrestricted. Restrictions on countries other than the US are
imposed on average and all restrictions are imposed on impact except for US GDP responses to an
supply shock. There we impose the restriction that responses have to be above zero for the first ten
quarters.
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5. Dynamic responses to supply and demand sided safe asset shocks
In this section we examine the impact of demand and supply shocks to safe assets
on the US economy. Additionally, we also assess the effect on the global economy by
analyzing the macroeconomic responses of each country in our dataset which covers a
broad range of emerging (EE) and advanced economies (AE). However, due to space
restrictions, we report impulse responses only for the US and for the remaining coun-
tries we rely on four simple regional averages (Western Europe, Asia, Latin America
and Other developed economies).23 These plots aim to provide an overview on the
dynamic responses of our endogenous variables. It is noteworthy that the correspond-
ing credible sets do not only include estimation and identification uncertainty24 (as in
the case of country-specific impulse responses) but also capture uncertainty related
to within-group heterogeneity. Thus, to provide another gauge on the statistical sig-
nificance of our findings we also report boxplots along with 25th and 75th credible
sets that depict the maximum response of a given variable for selected countries.25
Furthermore, while we are interested in a negative supply shock to US safe assets
we multiply the corresponding IRFs by −1 to obtain positive supply shocks to ease
comparison between both shocks in the following application.
To evaluate the impact of the ZLB on our findings we moreover report the posterior
median estimate of both shocks when we impose the ZLB constraint. Since the ZLB
has been binding only in recent years for most countries we view the responses with
interest rates unrestricted as our baseline scenario while the restrictions imposed on
short-term interest rate reactions may be viewed as a hypothetical scenario if the ZLB
would have been binding in the past.
5.1. Dynamic responses of the United States to supply and demand side safe asset shocks
Figure 1 displays responses to a one standard deviation26 positive demand shock
(first two columns on the left side) and one standard deviation positive supply shock
(last two columns on the right). The blue shaded areas represent 25th and 75th
credible sets with the posterior median in dark blue and the median of the responses
under the ZLB constraint in orange.
23We opt for simple averages to avoid our results being driven by a few large countries.
24Since we rely on sign restrictions we do not obtain exact identification but rather set identifica-
tion, implying that the posterior uncertainty associated with the impulse response functions is further
inflated.
25The countries included are the DE, BE,FR,IT , France and the UK (Western Europe group), CN, IN,
MY and PH (Asia group), BR, CL, MX and PE (Latin America group) and US, CA, JP, NZ and ZA (Other
developed economies group).
26Due to the SV specification we pick the last time point in our estimation sample.
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A safe asset demand shock leads to a positive reaction of US GDP, which increases
by around 0.15 percent. The response is positive during the first five quarters, and
turns insignificant afterwards. Inflation responses are rather muted, being insignifi-
cant over the impulse response horizon. By construction, the response of the policy
rate is zero initially, but allowed to move freely under the baseline scenario. Interest-
ingly, policy responses appear to be insignificant afterwards. By contrast, the orange
line remains stuck at zero, capturing the notion that the central bank is not capable
of moving interest rates when the ZLB is hit.
Turning to the reaction of the stock market, we see that initially, markets tend
to react in an insignificant fashion but display a pronounced decline after around
five quarters. We conjecture that the mixed effect at the short-end of the impulse
response horizon is due to two opposing sources. Equity prices might profit from
more favorable economic conditions in the US. However, given that the risk appetite
of US investors translates into increased demand for foreign bonds, financial market
participants sell US stocks, leading to declines in equity prices. Both effects might
offset each other initially, but the latter mechanism seems to be dominating at longer
impulse response horizons.
Volatility in financial markets, as measured by the VIX, decreases on impact by
five percent according to the posterior median. The decrease in the VIX reflects an
improvement in market confidence and a flattening of the yield curve, as investors
re-balance their portfolios. Such lower perceived risk and uncertainty boosts capital
inflows and compresses risk premia. Similar results are found in Bruno and Shin
(2015).
The supply shock leads to a rather long-lived reaction of US GDP and a short-lived
negative reaction of inflation. The decline in US output is in line with Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016), who show that when the scarcity of assets increases,
equilibrium in the market of safe assets is achieved by a reduction of output if the
interest rate hits the ZLB. The VIX tends to increase during the first ten quarters and
slightly decreases afterwards. Movements in equity prices appear to be insignificant,
suggesting that improved economic conditions and the increase in economic uncer-
tainty yield mixed evidence in terms of equity market dynamics.
The impact on the interest rate is zero on impact. However, similarly to the case
of a demand-based shock we find no statistically robust reaction of the central bank.
Interestingly, comparing the posterior median responses of all quantities under the
ZLB condition (i.e. with the structural coefficients of the monetary policy rule in the
US model zeroed out) we find only slight differences relative to the baseline scenario,
with all responses being within the credible set of the baseline scenario.
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Notes: Posterior distribution of impulse responses in percentage points. Median in black. Dotted
blue lines correspond to the 16th and 84th percentiles. Results are based on 35,000 posterior
draws. The red line indicates the zero line.
Figure 1: US domestic reactions
5.2. International responses
Figure 2 shows the output reaction to demand and supply shocks for the four re-
gional aggregates. Similarly to the US case, a shock to the supply of US safe assets
yields rather mixed output reactions across the globe. Only economies located in
western Europe and other developed countries display a positive reaction in terms
of real GDP, while countries located in Asia and Latin America do not display such
a pronounced increase. As noted in the introduction to this section, this finding can
be traced back to at least two sources, namely parameter uncertainty and intra-group
heterogeneity. The latter issue will be investigated in more detail below. It is note-
worthy that especially countries in Western Europe mirror the persistent increase in
US output sharply.
By contrast, demand shocks generate a positive reaction of output for most coun-
tries under scrutiny, with the exception of Latin America. Output reactions appear
to be rather long lasting for the majority of countries. This result corroborates the-
oretical findings that establish a positive relationship between capital inflows and
economic growth, i.e. foreign funding exerts downward pressure on interest rates
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and thus stimulates the economy (see Figure 2). Across regions, output responses
with respect to demand-sided shocks appear to be rather homogeneous, while the
responses to supply shocks are more heterogenous. This suggests that excess demand
of US safe assets stimulates foreign output through the portfolio rebalancing channel.
As shown in Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2015, 2016), the reaction of output
depends on the degree of financial integration across economies and whether the ZLB
is reached. The question whether the ZLB is reached is important because the inability
of short-term interest rates to reach an equilibrium implies that GDP reactions tend
to endogenously react to account for this fact. To assess whether this theoretical find-
ing holds within our empirical framework, we compare the responses obtained under
our baseline identification with the ones obtained by imposing the ZLB constraint in
the US. These findings indicate that output responses only differ marginally, suggest-
ing that when it comes to the international transmission of the shocks, the question
whether interest rates are constrained by zero only plays a rather limited role.
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Figure 2: Output reactions
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The impact of supply and demand shocks on international inflation appears to
be rather weak (see Figure 3). While the posterior median of each group-specific
response is above zero, we again see that the credible sets contain zero in all cases
and under both shocks considered. In fact, zooming in the different regions reveals
that the only countries that react in a significant fashion to a supply shock are France
and Italy (see the discussion below and Figure 10). However, in the case of a demand-
sided shock, the country-specific results reveal that inflation in Germany, Belgium
and New Zealand increases while Chinese CPI inflation falls. The reason for the
weak international responses of prices might be due to two sources, namely a general
increase in inflation due to excessive capital inflows and a sharp increase in global
liquidity and on the other hand tighter capital control measures to shield regions
(especially Asia) against inflationary developments.
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Figure 3: Inflation reactions
Looking at the responses of exchange rates reveals that demand shocks generate
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a rather heterogeneous pattern of responses across regions.27 Across all regions con-
sidered, we find strong reactions of European real exchange rates, with exchange rate
movements in other regions being more modest. Specifically, Figure 4 indicates that
European currencies depreciate vis-a´-vis the US dollar. The heterogeneous impact on
the real exchange rate across countries and regions might be driven by the rather loose
identification scheme adopted, where we assume that real exchange rates depreciate
on average, as opposed to the restriction that all countries display a depreciation on
impact.
Exchange rate responses to demand shocks are rather short lived. One possible
explanation is that monetary policy authorities in some emerging market economies
fear large and volatile capital inflows, therefore they lower the policy rate quickly
with the aim to prevent the exchange rate to appreciate. Indeed, Gourinchas and
Obstfeld (2012) show that a surge in capital inflows lead to strong exchange rates
fluctuations that are capable of pushing the country into a financial crisis in the event
of a sudden stop, making macroeconomic policy more difficult.
Similarly to the demand shock, a positive increase in the supply of safe assets
also leads to a depreciation of European real exchange rates against the dollar. Con-
sequently, it appears that a shortage in safe assets due to a shrinking supply trans-
lates into an exchange rate appreciation as noted in Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2016), (see Figure 4).
Demand shocks generate an initial negative response of short term interest rates in
Western Europe and Latin America, followed by a persistent increase (see Figure 5).
For other developed countries, we find considerable evidence of a long-lasting in-
crease in the interest rate over 20 quarters, while responses in Asia and Latin America
prove to be surrounded by large estimation uncertainty mostly. Supply shocks have a
limited impact on short-term interest rates. Indeed, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2016) shows that when the ZLB is reached, the international transmission of shocks
mainly occurs via the exchange rate and global output channel. While our responses
indicate that this also happens if US interest rates are allowed to vary freely, we would
like to stress that policy responses in the US are small under the baseline scenario.
Thus, even if the ZLB is not reached the transmission tends to happen through output
and exchange rate spillovers.
The response of the risk spread is depicted in Figure 6. Risk spreads decrease
on impact to a one standard deviation positive demand shock in Western Europe
and other developed economies by around 12 basis points. Quantitatively, supply
27The figure reports the exchange rate expressed as the foreign value of the dollar. Therefore, a
decrease in the exchange rate implies an appreciation of the foreign currency against the dollar.
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Figure 4: Exchange rate reactions
shocks have a weaker negative impact on the risk spread, with countries located
in Western Europe and the other developed countries group displaying a decline of
around 2.5 basis points measured by the median response. This indicates that the
risk spread is mainly driven by demand shocks, implying that US investors require a
lower risk premium to invest in foreign assets. The increase in the perceived safety
of foreign assets encourages US investors to reallocate parts of their capital from do-
mestic assets into foreign assets. Moreover, the ZLB and unconventional monetary
policy reduced the availability of safe assets for US investors, increasing the share
allocated to foreign assets in the US bond portfolio. Similar findings are found in
Burger, Sengupta, Warnock, and Warnock (2015). They show that global push factors
such as low US long-term interest rates and quantitative easing policies encourage
the re-allocation of international bond portfolios of US investors, who increasingly in-
vested in emerging markets local currency bonds. Differently from Burger, Sengupta,
Warnock, and Warnock (2015), we find a weak reaction of risk spreads in emerging
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Figure 5: Short-term interest rate reactions
market economies because our study focuses on the overall bonds acquired by US
residents in dollar-denominated assets, rather than local currency assets.
Equity prices respond positively to a one standard deviation positive demand shock
in the majority of countries in our sample (shown in Figure 7). The reaction is ele-
vated in the majority of countries, with equity prices increasing by about one percent
on average, with a stronger reaction in Western Europe. There, equity prices increase
by over two percent on average after one year. For three out of the four regional av-
erages, we find that the positive reactions of equity prices last for at least two years.
This corroborates findings in Shin (2012), Mendicino and Punzi (2014), Punzi and
Kauko (2015) and Sa´ and Wieladek (2015) who show that capital inflows lead to as-
set price booms in the receiving country. In particular, the low yield on US assets lead
US investors to search for yield, inflating asset prices in foreign countries. By contrast,
reactions of equity prices to a supply based shock turn out to be insignificant, suggest-
ing that the effects appear to be significantly weaker as compared to demand-sided
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Figure 6: Risk premium reactions
shocks.
Figure 8 reports impulse responses to demand and supply shock on claims, repre-
senting the preferences of US investors for foreign assets. The increasing demand of
US safe assets leads to a drop in US holdings of foreign assets from all regions. On the
other hand, positive supply shocks lead to a decrease in the US holdings of foreign
assets. Across regions, the decrease is persistent and about 0.5 percent, meaning that
the scarcity of US safe assets implies a stronger preference of US investors towards
foreign assets. This result is consistent with the findings in Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong
(2014), who report a strong negative correlation between the foreign share of the US
financial bond portfolio and the availability of US safe assets, providing evidence on
the expansion of the foreign financial sector, which has met the increasing US demand
for safe and liquid investment assets by expanding its supply. Bertaut, Tabova, and
Wong (2014) highlight the strong substitution effect between scarce US safe assets
and foreign-issued financial sector debt that appeared after the crisis.
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Figure 7: Equity price reactions
During the crisis, the US supplied safe assets via the US FED swap lines extended
to the ECB and several other selected central banks in order to provide them dollar
liquidity. The FED thereby acted as a global lender of last resort for dollars. We also
control for this stylized fact by including US swap lines in our modeling framework.
We find that both, demand and supply shocks only exert weak effects on swap lines,
meaning that the decision of offering swap lines by the US Fed is not driven by the
shortage of safe assets or domestic fundamentals (see Figure 9). Indeed, Allen, Moess-
ner, et al. (2010) found that the US supply of swap lines during the post-crisis period
was statistically significantly larger for economies with higher US dollar shortages and
with larger international financial centres.
The results presented hitherto have been based on regional averages and thus ne-
glect intra-group heterogeneity. Therefore, we avoided talking about statistical signif-
icance up to this point, only referring to statistically robust relations if the posterior
distribution of the averaged impulse responses does not contain zero or by cross-
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Figure 8: Claims reactions
checking whether individual countries within a group feature significant responses.
However, even if the average posterior distribution contains zero, it could be the case
that the responses are actually significant at the country level. To see this, note that
if two countries display the same (statistically) significant reaction in terms of mag-
nitudes but with opposing signs the average posterior response will certainly contain
zero. Thus, to provide some information on cross-country heterogeneity, we report
boxplots showing the peak response (positive and negative) of a given variable with
respect to safe asset demand and supply shocks for a set of selected countries. The
whiskers of the boxplots indicate whether a given response is significant and offer
information on the uncertainty surrounding the estimates, while the level of the bar
gives information on the size of the peak effect. Thus, if the red intervals include zero
the effect is statistically insignificant.
Figure 10 and Figure 11 report the peak effects at country level for a demand and
supply shock, respectively. These figures show that the peaks are higher for a demand
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Figure 9: Swap line reactions
shock rather than a supply shock.
In general, and for both shocks, we find that for output, equity prices and short-
term interest rates, the overall pattern described above in the case of the IRFs are
confirmed by looking at the posterior distribution of the peak response. For most
economies under consideration, we see statistically significant peak effects. Note
that for short-term interest rates, some countries display an significant peak increase
(mostly countries located inWestern Europe except Italy) whereas some other economies
typically feature negative responses of interest rates. This conclusion also carries over
to the real exchange rate, where the majority of currencies under scrutiny react by de-
preciating relative to the US dollar with some notable exceptions (for instance, South
Africa).
Responses of the risk spread to a demand shock are quite homogeneous across
countries, dropping on average by around ten to 15 basis points. This finding, how-
ever, does not carry over to the supply-based shock. There we find mixed responses,
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Figure 10: Peak effects of spillovers (aggregate demand shock)
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Figure 11: Peak effects of spillovers (aggregate supply shock)
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with countries in Western Europe mostly experiencing declines in their risk premia
whereas other countries like Canada face increasing risk spreads. While we see that
other countries do not react in a significant fashion, one finding stands out. The vast
majority of posterior mass of peak responses is concentrated above zero in the case
of a supply shock, indicating that there seems to be some upward pressure on risk
spreads in certain countries located outside of Europe.
Viewing these findings in light of the results presented for the impulse responses
suggests that the excess global demand for US safe assets spills over to foreign coun-
tries through the exchange rate and liquidity channel, while the insufficient supply of
US safe assets leads to a portfolio re-balance, as US investor search for yield.
6. Conclusive remarks
In this paper we investigate the international consequences of the shortage in US
safe assets. By adopting an empirical macroeconomic framework, that jointly models
a large set of economies under consideration, we explore the international transmis-
sion of supply and demand shocks to US safe assets. We estimate a Bayesian variant
of the Global VAR (GVAR) model coupled with stochastic volatility over the period
1994 to 2014 at quarterly frequency and consider 34 countries. To identify supply
shocks, we update data from Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012) until 2015. Their
measure is constructed as the sum of US government debt and the safe component of
private financial debt. On the demand side, we use US international liabilities from
Bertaut and Tryon (2007) and Bertaut and Judson (2014).
Our findings indicate that decreasing supply of US safe assets leads to a decline in
US output, pushing the country towards a recession. At the international level, this
effect spills over to other countries and foreign output also tends to fall, as predicted
in Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2015) and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2016). The shrinking supply of US assets lead US investors to search for investment
opportunities abroad. However, we would like to stress that this finding only holds for
a relatively limited set of countries in our dataset. On the other hand, we find sizable
macroeconomic effects of demand-sided shocks. The continuing foreign preferences
for US safe and liquid assets leads to persistent output increases and to a rather short-
lived decrease in the volatility index VIX. Financial markets, in general, tend to profit
from both shocks, displaying increases in equity prices for a large number of countries
considered. Internationally, foreign countries experience strong capital inflows stem-
ming from the US. Such surge in foreign funding affects foreign output in a positive
fashion and leads to pronounced increases in equity prices. Interest rates in foreign
economies tend to decrease in order to avoid adverse effect on the home countries’
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currency.
These results point towards different channels through which supply and demand
shocks feed into the global economy. We find that supply shocks spread globally
through portfolio re-balancing, while demand shocks impact the global economy
through the exchange rate and liquidity channel. Moreover, we find that demand
shocks definitely exert a much stronger impact on the US and the global economy.
Given the importance of the research question, it is of prime importance to derive
policy implications. Since both, insufficient supply and excess global demand for US
safe assets exerts downward pressure on interest rates, US investors are forced into
more risky domestic assets (during the pre-crisis period) and into foreign assets (after
the global financial crisis engulfed the world economy). Our findings indicate that
decreases in the supply of US safe assets has the potential to push the global economy
into a recession, making it necessary for US policy makers to consider supplying more
safe assets in order to avoid future recessions and circumvent price bubbles elsewhere.
Moreover, issuing more safe assets seems to exhibit inflationary pressure on the econ-
omy. At the international level, several countries have become increasingly innovative
in designing assets that may be viewed is relatively risk free, thus providing their own
safe assets, attracting even more US investors. However, creating new safe asset mar-
kets could lead to excess capital inflows, making it necessary for foreign countries to
implement capital controls. In addition, our findings, at least to some extent, suggest
that foreign central banks react to exchange rate pressure by lowering their policy
rates. The introduction of further capital control measures could thus help to regain
monetary policy independence.
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